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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with economic analysis of trademark. Its presence in 
markets is originally connected with the problem of information asymmetries and the 
need to provide information for assisting exchanges, so as to avert the market failure 
brought about by adverse selection. However this information-conveying function is also 
accompanied by a differentiation effect, arising from the power of persuasion that signs 
can exert on individuals. The exploitation of differentiation has given rise to the practice 
of branding, which ties markets and consumption to the realms of meaning and 
experience. Branding is so all-pervasive in today's economy as to have somehow 
transfigured it, so that the role  of persuasion is now pre-eminent. 
Nonetheless, the mainstream economic theory tends to resist acknowledging this change, 
which would to a large extent call into question well-established hypotheses and 
theoretical tools. The general response has therefore been to assume that the 
informational role of trademark predominates, and to use this hypothesis to construct 
models, welfare evaluations and policy prescriptions that bear little or no relation to the 
actual markets.   
The opposing approach - in the shadow of the Nelson’s and Arrow’s seminal papers on 
economics of information - is recognising the idiosyncratic character of information, and 
therefore drawing conclusions and devising solutions that, while still based upon the 
welfare criterion, also incorporate a wider awareness and a deeper representation of the 
scenario under study. The present work attempts to move in this direction, showing how 
different disciplines can provide some key epistemological tools for enabling economists 
to effectively evaluate the welfare outcomes of the introduction and progressive alteration 
of a particular intellectual property right within the realm of signs and meanings.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
If the Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 19th century ushered in a new way of 
thinking about economic activities, essentially connected with mass production, the second 
half of the 20th century brought a new revolution that is still in progress: the advent of the 
Information Society, embedded in the realms of knowledge and communication. 
The economic transformation effected through the diffusion of digital and communication 
technologies in the consumer market of the 1990s established the definitive ascendancy of the 
dematerialised economy
1. The ever increasing relative importance of its sectors in the various 
national economies has made these markets today central for assuring the prosperity and 
continued expansion of economic systems.  
The result has been the emergence of an economics of information, in which information is 
treated simultaneously as an object of consumption, productive element, commercial signal 
and much more. This opens up a potentially bewildering new prospect to scholars, due in 
particular to the not inconsiderable differences which exist between the economics of ideas 
and the economics of things. A difficulty which the economic theory has often simply 
sidestepped by assimilating present and future to the past, for example coining the oxymoron 
'intangible goods' in an attempt to reduce the fluid category of information into the concrete 
terms of goods and quantities. 
In this respect, the possibility of translating information into bits, which can be measured and 
divided in the same way as physical quantities, has further fuelled the illusion that intangibles 
can somehow be analogous to tangibles (see Shapiro and Varian, 1999). However the fallacy 
is soon exposed on passing from the container to the contents, at which point information 
encoding reveals itself to be an incomplete process, because it references a system of meaning 
that is inextricably bound up with society and interpersonal relations
2. 
Firms have nevertheless been quick to seize the new opportunities for profit in this sphere, 
initiating an ongoing process of appropriation of information and knowledge. Clearly, this 
process of ‘propertization of just about everything’ (Merges, 2006) has in its turn fostered a 
particular regulatory dynamic aimed at creating the necessary instruments for the extension of 
appropriability. The TRIPs agreements ratified as part of GATT, whose objective is to 
regulate not just international trade but also the national legal systems on matters of 
intellectual property, are in this respect one of the most obvious examples of the deterministic 
effects that economic interests can have on the statutory system (Ryan, 1998). This once again 
confirms the existence of a dialectical relationship between the pressures of the real economy 
and the regulatory process, which has provided the groundwork for information markets to 
emerge and develop.  
The above dialectic is the backdrop for the economic theory whose task it is to evaluate the 
effect of the regulations on the markets and on welfare, formulating appropriate policy 
prescriptions. This is no small undertaking because, even though the commodification of 
information makes it seem more like the goods traditionally exchanged on markets, it still 
does not remove the peculiarity of its being tied to cognitive and communication processes, 
for which specific tools and modes of treatment are required.  
                                                 
1 For example, during the 1990s the relative importance of copyright-protected information goods in the US 
economy gradually increased, to the point that these became the leading export item in 1996 (ref. the reports of 
the International Intellectual Property Allliance at http://www.iipa.com/ ). On the historical background see also 
Carlaw et al.(2006). 
2 We are referring here to the literature which represents knowledge as the sum of two complementary 
dimensions: codified and tacit knowledge (see Cowan, R., P. A. David and D. Foray, 2000).    3
The above objection can be traced to the seminal contribution of Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962), who pointed out the idiosyncratic nature of information, and how the virtues and 
effects of the appropriation of information through intellectual property rights (IPRs) require a 
specific paradigm, distinct from that of the physical economy, and in fact produce 
fundamentally different results. One leit motif which clearly emerges is that the rent-seeking 
impulses stimulated by the new rights are only weakly compatible with the maximising of 
economic welfare, and therefore the consequences of the IPRs on the market must be 
carefully evaluated. 
The present contribution takes the above observation as a starting point to follow the 
evolution of the simplest (in economic terms) and probably, alongside trade secret, the oldest 
intellectual property right: trademark
3. Its formerly de facto - and then subsequently de jure - 
use within exchanges predates the Information Society by thousands of years. Trademark law 
is justified on the grounds of correcting information asymmetries, and would thus appear 
solely motivated by reasons of efficiency as the remedy to a market failure. 
However today's market also exhibits a second dimension of trademark, connected with the 
impact on consumers of the meaning conveyed by the commercial sign. This has generated 
branding strategies that are just as important to the efficiency balance, and have seen 
maximum expansion under the current technological system. These practices are essentially 
rent-seeking in nature, even though they may also have incidentally beneficial effects on 
welfare, and have resulted in a gradual alteration of both the statutory system which regulates 
the appropriation of information, and the structure of the market itself. 
Overall, therefore, the process of trademark's mutation into brand has caused a kind of market 
for signs and meanings to emerge, characterised by a multiplicity of attributes and economic 
effects that the economic theory has not yet fully understood. So that it might seem opportune 
to heed the policy prescription formulated by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), that in the 
absence of univocal and universally valid effects, the extension of appropriation via IPR 
beyond a minimum level must be approached with caution. However the exact opposite has 
taken place in recent years. 
The present work is organised as follows: section 2 introduces, frames and discusses the 
relationship between the law and the economics of IPRs, pointing out the ambiguities which 
arise. Section 3 traces the evolution of trademark's relationship with the market, from a signal 
originally introduced to remedy an information asymmetry, subsequently transformed into a 
tool for creating market power, and finally into a commodity. Section 4 discusses the 
problems connected with extrapolating the traditional efficiency criterion to a context shaped 
by an ever changing interplay of communication, regulations and behaviours, such that the 




2.  Information, Law and Economics 
 
The cornerstone of today's information economics is without a doubt the system of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), which provides the institutional framework regulating 
these markets
4. The catchall label IPR in reality denotes an assemblage of legal doctrines--
namely patent, copyright, trademark and trade secret—that differ in their structures and fields 
                                                 
3 In the text, the term trademark is used to denote both the commercial instrument and the law which protects it. 
4This does not, of course, rule out other crucial and complementary components such as technology, generally a 
necessary prerequisite for the emergence of information markets. For example the recording industry was made 
possible by a combination of the property right and the existence of sound recording and playback technology 
(Silva and Ramello, 2000).    4
of application, but all share the common trait of granting the owner rights over the economic 
exploitation of an idea or its 'reification" (i.e. its expression in any tangible medium, as in the 
case of copyright-author’s right). Such rights are generally exclusive, meaning that the owner 
is given a legal monopoly over the protected information, albeit with various limitations on its 
duration and scope.  
From this perspective, therefore, and despite their various specific attributes and differences
5, 
all the IPRs share a common origin rooted in the advent of the information and knowledge 
economy and the possibility of privately appropriating certain types of information. However 
because of its fluid character, inextricably bound up with the communication paradigm and 
the sphere of meaning, information is necessarily of collective origin and so naturally 
incompatible with the category of property, which was instead devised for scarce resources
6. 
A sufficiently convincing ad hoc justification was therefore required for an institution which 
permits the extensive appropriation of information and its entry into the price system
7. The 
argument put forward was the utilitarian one of creating an incentive for producing or 
disclosing new information, used since the days of the royal licenses and privileges granted 
by monarchs, and more recently explicitly formalised by Bentham
 8. 
It is worth noting that whereas appropriation and property rights are an inevitable 
consequence of the exploitation of scarce resources, and hence commonly occur in most 
human societies, to the point of being a sort of 'universal institution' (Demsetz, 1998; Bailey, 
1998), intellectual property is instead referred to resources that are not scarce within a 
particular social context—i.e. western society—and so has required the design of a special 
legal category. This confirms the idiosyncratic nature of the institution and the need to 
artificially devise some convincing justification, which is instead inherent for the 
conventional ownership of physical resources
9.  
Despite their common justificatory argument, each of the IPRs has a distinct mechanism 
geared to the economic role of the information which it protects. Copyright and patent are 
designed to provide an economic incentive to creators/inventors for stimulating the 
production/disclosure of new information in the artistic and technological fields. Trade secret 
likewise seeks to stimulate the creativity of individuals, but does so by assuring 
appropriability of economic benefits through a peculiar form of property: the attribution of 
secrecy rights to those who produce certain types of information, generally pertaining to 
production processes (e.g. the formula for a particular soft drink, a customer list, etc.). 
Finally, trademark too has the function of promoting the creation of new information, but 
which in this case is not itself (at least not originally) the object of the exchange, but rather an 
accessory to the good being exchanged. What in economics language would be termed a 
'signal’. In other words, the information created through trademark has the function of 
facilitating consumer choice and averting opportunistic behaviour on the part of producers.  
                                                 
5 Which can at times partially overlap, as in the case of software in the US legal system, to which copyright and 
patent are simultaneously applied. 
6 As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz pointed out (1973, p.11), speaking of culture in its broader 
anthropological sense that also includes information and knowledge, “[it] is public because meaning is”. See 
Ramello (2005b).  
7 It is important here to avoid all ambiguity. For example secrecy has since the dawn of time enabled the 
appropriation of knowledge. However an informal reliance on secrecy, without the backup of a robust and well-
defined institutional framework, only allows for limited and poorly enforceable appropriability. 
8 “which one man has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws […]” (in Ramello 
2005a , p. 71). 
9 Further confirming the idiosyncratic character of the regulations protecting intellectual property is the crucial 
importance of social recognition on the part of consumers and competitors. Repeated episodes of infringement in 
various sectors in fact reflect a persistent reluctance to acknowledge the value of the institution, even where it 
has existed for a long time. For a discussion referred to copyright infringement, file-sharing systems and 
consumer evaluations, see Maffioletti and Ramello (2004).   5
According to the above interpretation, IPRs constitute a remedy that is introduced into 'the 
market' to produce efficiency: this is the neoclassical thesis by definition. 
However the IPRs also have another characteristic that is relevant to the economic theory, but 
has not (with some exceptions) been fully addressed by the literature: namely that, by the very 
fact of being property rights, IPRs contribute to shape the market structure, regulating the 
competitive scenario and determining the rational behaviour of economic agents.  
In other words, these rights are much more than just a remedy to a market failure: by 
changing the rules of the game, in agreement with the findings of neo-institutional theory they 
cause new strategies to emerge which in turn feed back into the institutional framework and 
so progressively alter the market structure. 
The general outcome of the above described scenario is the emergence of fairly concentrated 
industrial sectors characterised by rather low competition levels and substantial market power, 
tending in balance toward a monopoly situation
10. The efficiency balance is therefore not at 
all obvious, with the attainment of welfare being to some extent dogmatically asserted rather 
than proven. 
However such a stance goes against the recommendation of Arrow and Nelson, that also 
recurs elsewhere in the literature, according to which the economic analysis of information 
markets should address itself to “a myriad of special cases and few general principles” Stiglitz 
(1985, p. 21). In such circumstances we must beware of sweeping conclusions, because the 
outcomes may be very different from those anticipated. 
The economic analysis of trademark offers an interesting case study. On the one hand, it 
illustrates how a particular intellectual property right, originally designed to provide 
information to facilitate exchanges, has evolved into a property right within the 
semantic/semiotic sphere that is in some measure comparable to patent and copyright—so that 
the sign ultimately becomes a product and an object of consumption in its own right. On the 
other hand, it points out a degree of inertia in the practices of economists, who often appear 
locked into static efficiency justifications that do not take the above changes into account. 
 
 
3.  The Evolving Relationship between Trademark and Economics 
 
To better understand the previous assertion, we must go back to the starting point: “In the 
beginning was the sign…” 
 
3.1 The Mainstream Economics of Sign and Trademark  
 
Trademark is fundamentally a sign. According to a widely accepted definition, a 'sign' is 
anything that stands for something else. Modern semiology, the Greek word meaning the 
science of signs, represents this architecture as a composite system of relations between a 
signifier, a signified and a referent
11. The 'signifier' is the identifiable sign, the 'signified' is the 
semantic content of the sign, i.e. its meaning, and the 'referent' is that object to which both 
                                                 
10 Even in cases where the total number of products available is considerable –as in the market of CDs –the 
successful items generally have low interchangeability, enabling the owner of the IPR to behave like a local 
monopolist (Silva and Ramello, 2000; Ramello, 2005a). Persisting situations of this type have led to the 
concentration of markets in various industry sectors (OECD, 1998), ultimately resulting in monopolies, as in the 
pay-Tv sector of several European countries (Nicita and Ramello, 2005).  
11 Semiology is defined as the science which “explores the nature and function of signs as well as the systems 
and processes underlying signification, expression, representation and communication “(Beebe, 2004, p. 626). 
For an extensive description of trademark from a semiotic perspective, again see Beebe (2004).   6
sign and meaning are referred
12. In simplified terms, we can say that a sign is nothing more 
than a kind of label—technically it is termed a 'semiotic device'—which conveys a meaning 
that denotes some particular object. Human interactions are permeated with such labels that 
are necessary tools for communication and collective human activities.  
Words and writing, for example, fall within the broad category of signs. Their existence is 
necessary to permit communication, and hence interactions between individuals. We can thus 
assert that the presence of signs is a necessary precondition for the existence of human 
groupings, and in fact there is no human society from which signs are absent.  
Economics, in the sense of the 'efficient use of resources', can be said to lie at the very roots 
of the origins of signs. A sign in fact serves as an economical distillation of some broader 
concept. For example the word 'fish', or a stylised drawing of a fish, makes it possible to 
concisely convey an idea that would otherwise—in the absence of appropriate signs—require 
a cumbersome description such as 'the animal that lives in the sea, with a streamlined body 
and fins, etc. and/or the display of an actual specimen. In this respect, communication theory 
speaks of the ‘maximum effectiveness" of information (Shannon and Weaver, 1962). 
From this perspective, it is clear that signs have the function of lowering the costs of social 
expression/communication, and that they can produce informational economies of scale to the 
extent that they are socially shared. Now, even though the above-described economic origin 
of signs stands apart from the market, being instead a response to the broader needs of human 
groups, the attendant advantages can nevertheless also be exploited by the market, which in 
fact soon appropriates them. With the advent of organised trade, the economics virtues of 
signs became more widely apparent as informational effect of the sign—now become at least 
implicitly a trademark—resolved the problem of how to identify the provenance of a good 
(i.e. its maker) as the distance between the points of production and consumption increased 
(Blakett, 1998). In the absence of a recognisable geographical origin, trademark provides a 
virtual identity that reconstructs useful meaning for guiding consumer choice. Producers or 
guilds are thus able to identify themselves through their trademarked products, and signal 
their quality of workmanship. Bearing this out, trademark occurs across the board in human 
cultures and is generally positively correlated with expanding lines of trade, even where an 
intellectual property system does not subsequently develop. Signed or trademarked products 
have appeared in many different societies and in nearly all historical periods
13.  
The Industrial Revolution, which strengthened the process of division of labour, further 
magnified the above effect because economies of scale commonly require decentralisation of 
production, while mass consumption increases the purchaser's need for effective information. 
Thus began the era of the trademark, which continued to gain strength during the century that 
followed with the expansion in consumption and the new potential for exploitation opened up 
by modern technologies.  
The economic theory, on its part, found ready justifications in support of trademark's welfare 
enhancing role. From a demand-side perspective, trademark is a ‘signal', that can take a 
variety of forms
14, and which offers a solution for safeguarding consumers and producing 
                                                 
12 In the context of trademark the signifier is represented by the tangible form of the trademark, the signified is 
the semantic content of the trademark and the referent is the product or the producer to which the mark is 
attached. 
13 For example in the Etruscan, Greek, Roman and Chinese civilisations for the production of pottery, but also 
for silk and even for bricks in Asia Minor and in ancient Egypt (see Wilkins, 1992, Blakett, 1998). Trademarks 
have been found throughout the Roman Empire for a wide variety of products such as wines (e.g., ‘M. Fabi 
Eupori Cnidum’ [Cnidum made by Marcus Fabius Euporus]) or the garum sauce, a Roman delicatessen made by 
mixing entrails and other fish parts (Rokicki, 1987). 
14 Legal practice shows that a trademark can consist of a single semiotic device-a logo, a name, a word, a 
number, a trade dress, etc.--or of several semiotic devices combined in various ways (see Blackett, 1998; 
Economides 1998; Landes and Posner 1987 and 2003).   7
efficiency. The underlying economic problem is the presence of information asymmetries and 
adverse selection: in the absence of adequate information, consumers are unable to determine 
the quality of what they are purchasing and therefore make choices which, taken together, are 
sub-optimal for the market
15.  
The creation of a credible signal—such as that provided by trademark—is able to avert the 
market failure. Akerlof explicitly asserts […An] example of an institution which counteracts 
the effects of quality uncertainty is the brand-name good” (Akerlof, 1970, p.499). 
So trademark is clearly not a good in its own right, but rather a signal, and it follows that 
trademark is not property in the conventional sense—it cannot be exchanged—but rather an 
economic device accessory to the exchange.  
What is more, the ability of trademark to promote informational efficiency can extend beyond 
its direct information-conveying function. In fact, according to the literature that studies the 
economic effects of liability systems on efficiency, trademark can function as a sort of 
complement to the regulations, stepping in where the conventional ‘command and control’ 
type instruments–i.e. those which define rules and seek to enforce them—fail to fully deter 
harmful behaviour (Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson, 1990). Looked at in this way, trademark 
therefore contributes to producing a public good, namely deterrence (Ramello, 2006).  
The deterrent effect was first described by Akerlof (1970, pp. 499-500) who noted how 
“[trademarks] not only indicate quality but also give the consumer a means of retaliation if the 
quality does not meet expectations”. In other words, in case of wrong-doing, the 
recognisability of the producer enables the market to impose ex-post penalties on the 
tortfeasor that greatly exceed the economic value of the damages, thereby providing an 
incentive for virtuous behaviour, and ultimately producing deterrence. The above has been 
observed in certain empirical studies aimed at measuring the losses incurred by firms in the 
event of product recalls, deceptive advertising, fraud and the like
16. In many cases, the 
implicated trademarks effectively suffered a loss in value, resulting from consumer alienation 
and/or decline in share price, that far exceeded the actual magnitude of the damages caused. 
Viewed in this way “[t]he loss of trademark capital has the same effect as a penalty clause in 
deterring a promisor from breaching [a contract]. Unlike a penalty clause, however, the 
wealth loss borne by the promisor does not accrue to the promisee; thus it does not provide an 
incentive to induce breach” (De Alessi and Staaf, 1994, p. 480). 
The efficiency argument is further strengthened if we consider the supply-side perspective. 
According to firm theory à la Williamson and the subsequent refinements brought to it by the 
'firm capabilities' (Teece, 1988) and 'new property rights' (Hart, 1995) approaches, the sign 
becomes instrumental for defining the boundaries of the firm. In other words, the existence of 
trademark makes it possible for firms to adopt the hierarchy best suited to achieving 
production efficiency.  
In certain cases trademark has facilitated the emergence of vertically integrated firms, and 
here again the root cause  is the adverse selection problem. Because of the information 
asymmetry that arises when maker and buyer are geographically distant, producers must 
remain near to the consumers, so that a fragmented distribution of the latter precludes the 
emergence of large-scale production organisations. Trademark, as a signal, resolves this 
problem and so opens the door to economies of scale and scope in production (and sometimes 
also in information), which make it easier to access capital markets, attract and train specialist 
personnel and attain optimal levels of R&D expenditure, ultimately resulting in the birth of 
the modern corporation (Wilkins, 1992; Economides, 1998) 
                                                 
15 The final outcome of such a situation is a reduction in both the average quality of products and the size of the 
market; in the extreme case of Akerlof's 'Market of Lemons' (1970) all of trade is eliminated, to the detriment of 
economic welfare. 
16 See for references De Alessi and Staaf (1994).   8
In other situations, trademark—as also the other intellectual property rights
17—can instead 
lead to the emergence of smaller, specialised production units organised as standalone firms. 
In this case, the residual rights attributed to the owner by trademark law essentially have the 
function of lowering transaction costs, discouraging opportunistic behaviour and so 
eliminating the hold-up problem (Hart, 1995). One such example is franchising, which 
through use of trademark allows an upstream firm (the franchisor) to specialise in the 
production of certain goods and services, also including reputation-building, while the 
downstream firm (the franchisee) is able to specialise in distribution and cut some of the risks 
connected with operating on the market, obviously subject to certain contractual terms 
designed to maintain the value of the reputation acquired by the franchisor (Ramello, 2006). 
Here too, albeit in a more complex manner, trademark works by creating information, which 
in this case is the reputation of the franchisor.  
Finally, it should be noted that the information-conveying role of trademark is explicitly 
acknowledged by the different national laws, and variously reasserted therein: for example, in 
order to obtain protection a trademark must be 'inherently distinctive', that is to say able to 
directly perform its function of conveying information. If this is not univocally accomplished, 
so that the signal may be ineffective--as in the case of a trade name that corresponds to a 
commonly used surname—the trademark must be shown to have a ‘secondary meaning’ i.e. 
an acquired ability to distinguish (also termed ‘acquired distinctiveness’) that unequivocally 
denotes a particular economic activity. A similar line of reasoning is applied in the opposite 
case of trademarks which become 'generic', entering into the common language to designate a 
general category of products—as in the case of frigidaire, elevator, aspirin, etc. When this 
occurs, trademark laws provide for cancellation of the exclusive right over the sign because 
its specific information-conveying function has lapsed (Economides, 1998; Landes and 
Posner, 1987 and 2003).  
 
 
3.2 Distinctiveness, Differentiation and Commodification of Signs: the 
Changing Economic Life of Trademark 
 
The signal created by trademark facilitates the emergence of a complementary economic 
phenomenon, differentiation, which must also be included in the welfare evaluation. In point 
of fact the relative importance of differentiation, as we shall see below, has grown over time 
to become pre-eminent in the modern use of trademark. And the national trademark laws have 
accordingly evolved, under the pressure of these new economic interests, to assist in the 
exploitation of differentiation. 
The above concept can be further clarified by going back to the original semiotics, and noting 
that the distinguishing effect of trademark can be broken down into two components 
operating on two distinct, though interconnected, planes. One of these is ‘source 
distinctiveness’, i.e. the previously described function of referring to a source, which is used 
to identify the provenance of the good. The second is the ‘differential distinctiveness’, which 
instead signals how a particular trademark differs from the others (Beebe, 2005). When this 
latter component comes into play, it makes a sign more visible than the competing ones.  
In legal practice this is generally referred to as the 'strength' of trademark, which is ultimately 
the trademark's ability to take on a character of uniqueness in the eyes of consumers. In 
marketing language we speak instead of ‘salience’ or of ‘brand awareness’ (Ehrenberg and 
Barnard, 1997; Aaker, 1991).  
                                                 
17 Ref. Arora and Merges (2004) for the case of patent.   9
These two levels of ‘distinctiveness’, often dealt with as one in the practice of trademark law, 
have very different consequences in economic terms. In fact, whereas the 'source 
distinctiveness' serves to identify the maker of a good, 'differential distinctiveness' is used to 
alter how the consumer perceives a particular trademark compared to others, and thus 
produces differentiation in the economic sense. 
Naturally, the distinction is not perfectly clear cut because markets always include some 
degree of inevitable differentiation
18. Absolute homogeneity of goods is rarely achieved 
because, even in a competitive market, a multitude of minor elements can diminish, even if 
slightly, the perfect interchangeability between producers (for example the likableness of the 
salesperson or other psychological factors which, in a barely perceptible manner, lessen the 
effect of price competition).  
The above described mechanism marks the metamorphosis of the sign from 'trademark', 
which has a traditional semiotic function aimed at remedying a lack of information in the 
market, into 'brand' in which the balance between signifier and signified has shifted in favour 
of the latter, so that it starts to become 'confused' with the referent. In other words, the 
semantic value of the trademark-turned-brand becomes the object of the strategies enacted by 
firms to strengthen consumer bonding and thereby acquire market power.  
This brings us to the practice of 'branding', in which the sign is used as a tool to create 
meaning that goes beyond the sphere of information to enhance that of 'differential 
distinctiveness', so that competition is transferred onto non-price elements. This is further 
facilitated by modern communication methods and certain commercial practices that have 
been fostered or even directly engendered by the technological scenario. 
  ‘Branding’ has the outright aim of creating market power, i.e. diminishing the 
interchangeability of products and, as widely noted in the marketing literature, increasing the 
consumer's willingness-to-pay for a particular good (Aaker, 1996). In this respect, therefore, 
the function of the trademark-become-brand is to create a positive externality on the good 
which it accompanies (the referent, in semiotic language). It must be said, however, that in 
many cases this differentiation arises from the semantic component of the brand—i.e. the 
signified—so that the differentiation is created in the semiotic sphere and not through any 
objective attributes of the good being exchanged. In the extreme case, two goods may be 
objectively identical yet semiotically differentiated. 
The culmination of this process is the possibility of creating so-called 'strong' or 'famous' 
trademarks, in which the differential distinctiveness component is maximised (Blakett, 1998, 
Beebe, 2004).  
All in all, the arguments presented thus far point to the existence of a special relationship 
between distinctive signs and consumers, which goes beyond the purely informational sphere 
to touch the emotive and psychological realms: individuals look to signs for much more than 
their purely informational value,  and consume their meaning. 
As generally happens within markets, firms have been quick to note this peculiarity and 
develop strategies for capitalising on affection for signs. This is for example the origin of 
‘brand loyalty’, in which repeated purchases are secured through endogenously generated 
purchase inertia, by creating psychological switching costs in buyers, with a final welfare 
balance that is at the very least problematic (Aaker, 1991; Klemperer, 1995). 
This inertia in choice can be further leveraged through practices which transfer the acquired 
market power from one market to another. We speak in this case of ‘brand extension’ if the 
                                                 
18 Semiology seems to agree because it observes (see Barthes, 1964, Elements of Semiology in Beebe, 2004, p. 
662) an inevitable process of ‘semantization’ by which any object becomes “pervaded with meaning. […][A]s 
soon as there is a society, every usage is converted into a sign itself”.   10
trademark is transferred between similar products, or of ‘brand stretching’ if the transfer takes 
place between very different products
19.  
Now, although these practices can create informational economies of scale, remedying a 
multitude of information asymmetries in different markets all at once, through the creation of 
a single signal (Choi, 1998), they also show how trademark can be used to transfer an increase 
in willingness-to-pay and hence in utility (which is market power from the firm's perspective) 
onto other, distant markets (Pepall and Richards, 2002).  
This opens up the dimension of 'brand equity', defined as the 'incremental utility' to the 
consumer or the 'value added' to a product by its trademark (Aaker, 1991 and 1996). The sign 
becomes itself endowed with a specific value that can be independently transferred from one 
product to the other.  
This is the first step toward its progressive 'individualisation' and separation from physical 
goods: the semiotic device/information acquires a specific economic value that is independent  
of its associated product. If anything, its sale alongside other, physical goods is merely a 
vehicle for selling the sign and its associated meaning, whereas “[i]n many cases, the 
trademark referent is now little more than a legal fiction” (Beebe, 2004, p. 625).  
Some scholars speak of a ‘divorce' of trademarks from the goods they are supposed to 
represent, and which in fact heralds their ‘commodification’ (Lemley, 1999). Trademarks, as 
Judge Alex Kozinsky observes (in Beebe, 2004, p. 657) have “begun to leap out of their role 
as source-identifiers and, in certain instances, have effectively become goods in their own 
right”. To the point of swapping roles so that the physical goods become the vehicles for 
selling the signs, albeit with some particular attributes. Firstly, consumption of a sign can be 
renewed and quantitatively strengthened through the repeated purchase of different goods 
containing it. Secondly, whereas consumption of a physical good generally produces satiation, 
the capacity for consumption of a sign appears to be limited only by the consumer's 
pocketbook and attention span.  
However this metamorphosis of trademark has one immediate and significant effect, i.e. that 
an informational tool originally intended as an adjunct to the market for safeguarding 
consumers has been converted into a property right over a sign (McClure, 1996). The nature 
of trademark is thus fundamentally altered, so that the incentive it provides is no longer for 
creating information that will remedy an information asymmetry, but rather for creating an 
almost purely informational product--a sign—which the creator then appropriates in much the 
same way as might happen under copyright and patent. 
While information economics has yet to find an effective approach for dealing with this newly 
acquired independence of the sign, the corresponding transformation of the property right has 
instead been assimilated with surprising promptitude into the laws and their interpretation, in 
both the US and Europe. 
The above development, described in numerous legal contributions, has reached its 
culmination with the ‘anti-dilution’ clauses introduced into the various national legal 
systems
20. Some scholars expressively speak of ‘doctrinal puzzlement’, noting that the 
enactment of these anti-dilution measures, after being pushed back several times, was 
ultimately achieved through protracted lobbying efforts (McCarthy, 2004).  
                                                 
19 An example of brand extension is the production of iPod on the part of Apple. An example of brand stretching 
is the production of soft drinks by Virgin, an airline operator (and before that, a recording label). 
20 In Europe, anti-dilution regulations have been enacted by member states in implementation of Directive 
89/104/CE, known as the Trademark Directive articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2), even though the word 'dilution' does not 
appear in the text of the directive. In the US the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, universally known as the 
Lanham Act, has been amended to include a specific anti-dilution measure from the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act in 1995. See, for example, in the extensive legal literature Beebe (2004 and 2005); McCarthy (2004).    11
In a few words, a claim of dilution may be raised whenever a trademark, though not causing 
confusion to consumers, produces ‘detriment to the distinctive character’ of another famous 
trademark as the European legal system puts it
21, or results in a ‘lessening of the capacity of a 
famous mark to identify goods and services’ in the words of the US law
22. The central idea is 
that, even where there is no infringement or confusion, use of a trademark similar to a famous 
one in a non-competing market may be prohibited because it compromises the distinguishing 
effect of the famous trademark in the broader sense: ‘by tarnishment’ if the production of 
lower quality goods alters—albeit indirectly—consumer perceptions of the famous trademark, 
or ‘by blurring’ in cases where a sort of semiotic free-riding occurs (the consumer is not 
confused, but the distinguishing effect of the famous trademark is exploited and, according to 
this regulation, depleted by the other trademark).  
Now, it is clear that violations of 'source distinctiveness' fall within the remit of normal 
trademark infringement procedures, because they cause confusion in consumers who are no 
longer able to clearly associate a signifier to a referent. However in the case of dilution this 
confusion does not exist, and the protection is given directly to the signified that produces 
differential distinctiveness. In other words, protection against dilution establishes a property 
right that reaches beyond the signifier to enter the sphere of the signified
23. The anti-dilution 
measures therefore protect the investments sustained in creating the semiotic product—and 
thus also the revenues and their extension—sanctioning the new nature of trademark/brand as 
a property right which grants a legal monopoly over a wide signifier-signified relationship.  
 
 
4.  The Puzzling Issue of Economic Welfare  
 
The above discussion reveals the many-sided character of trademark, which continues to 
mutate and change aspect in response to economic, technological and institutional change. 
However this is not a simple case of  'split personality' in the style of Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde, but rather a more elaborate and gradual process of continual adaptation of 
trademark to the evolving context in which it is embedded. Not one, or two or multiple 
personalities, therefore, but an ongoing succession of incremental changes that must be 
carefully factored into the economic evaluation. These adaptations of trademark also have a 
feedback effect upon the institutional and market structure that alters the competitive scenario, 
so that regulatory measures designed for the old state of affairs no longer have the expected 
outcomes. 
Law is generally better equipped to take on board this evolutionary dialectic, because of its 
natural orientation toward social interaction and the attendant process of ongoing change. Law 
in fact takes a pragmatic approach to the drafting and interpretation of its regulations, relying 
on a system of rigorous logical categories which can, however, be flexibly moulded to fit 
contingent needs and follow the evolution of the interests that it contributes to govern. 
Economics (or at least neoclassical economics), in contrast, generally uses static models 
assuming given institutions, issuing recommendations and evaluating outcomes primarily on 
the basis of the efficiency criterion, which though logically robust may also prove overly rigid 
and constrictive for dealing with social phenomena. Organisations and choices are evaluated 
in terms of welfare, that is to say the efficient use of resources, and from a normative 
                                                 
21 Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003, 1 C. M. L. R. 14 
22 Lanham Act, Section 43c, 15 USC Section 112 
23 “In this sense, trademark dilution constitutes not a trespass on the plaintiff’s signified, but rather a kind of 
nontrespassory nuisance as to the plaintiff’s signifier. The action for trademark dilution is designed to prevent 
such nuisances and, in doing so, to preserve the differential distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s signifier, regardless 
of to what referent it is affixed” (Beebe, 2004, p. 676).    12
perspective, so that all those choices and organisational solutions which lead to increased 
welfare are considered to be desirable and justifiable
24.  
The above is the approach that has characterised the law and economics literature of the 
Chicago school, which assumes that law is or should be oriented toward welfare. Looking 
explicitly at trademark law, for example, this approach maintains that, “like tort law in general 
[…] , can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic 
efficiency” and that therefore any suspicion concerning “the power of brand advertising to 
bamboozle the public and thereby promote monopoly” is to be discounted (Landes and 
Posner, 1987, p. 265 and pp. 274-275, reasserted in 2003).  
This position disregards the critical observations and methodological guidelines proposed by 
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), in our view quite correctly, for dealing with matters of 
information and its regulation. While keeping the welfare objective firmly in mind, the two 
authors also attempt to capture the idiosyncratic nature of information and the effects of the 
institutions created for governing the information market. In particular, the contribution of 
Arrow (1962) examines how efficiency may be pursued in the specific case of inventions for 
productive purposes, and observes that such a context does not permit the existence of a 
perfectly competitive market. The consequent policy prescription, which sounds nowadays 
heterodox, is that an optimal allocation of resources for inventive activities requires public or  
non-profit institution to finance research activities and the creative innovation process (Arrow, 
1962).  
The message is clear: the task of economic theory is to critically evaluate laws – in this case 
patent law - and on the basis of the only robust criterion at its disposal, i.e. welfare, to propose 
efficient solutions. It must not seek to justify those laws at all costs, but rather critically 
examine their contribution to the attainment of welfare.   
The recurring invocation of welfare reflects the fact that this criterion is the cornerstone of 
neoclassical theory: no policy or regulatory proposal has any economic sense unless it can be 
justified in terms of producing increased welfare. However the neoclassical theory is also 
marred by certain sweeping and analytical simplifications. This is especially true for the case 
of information markets and, hence, of trademark. Here the conventional assumptions 
concerning the nature of goods, the rational behaviours of consumers, and competition are 
seriously challenged by the results brought by other disciplines and by evidence. It is 
therefore questionable to draw welfare implications from weak or unreasonable hypothesis. 
So we are left with two alternative and antithetical ways out of the difficulty. The first is the 
mainstream approach, of which a good example for the case of trademark is the contribution 
by Landes and Posner (1987, 2003): accepting the positive economics assumption that 
realistic hypotheses are not necessary for building models (Friedman, 1953). The models 
obtained in this way are not validated against real-world facts, but instead used to draw 
regulatory conclusions as if the models themselves were the reality. To put it another way, the 
reality is deconstructed in order to rebuild a different one, substituting this Alice's wonderland 
for the world in which we live. Such an approach doesn’t offer any serious description of 
facts, nor leads to relevant policy prescriptions because it is unconcerned with the actual 
working of economic and legal problems. Resultant economic recipes become useless or even 
counterproductive. 
The alternative route is to squarely confront the practical and theoretical difficulties arising 
from the application of the theory, and attempt to adapt it through a careful examination of the 
hypotheses, proposing welfare-enhancing solutions. This is essentially the spirit of Nelson and 
Arrow's proposal. The discussion that follows will take this second approach of seeking to 
                                                 
24 On the limits of this approach see Thaler (2000).   13
pinpoint which are the critical hypotheses, and identifying opportunities for reviewing the 
trademark protection regulations. 
 
4.1. The nature of goods and the behaviour of consumers 
 
The post-industrial economies, and particularly the Information Society, are currently 
witnessing a change in the nature of goods. The demand for ‘things’–tangible goods produced 
by agriculture and manufacturing or intangible activities performed for clients (i.e. services), 
purchased to satisfy biological or practical needs—is increasingly giving way to that for 
‘experiences’, staged by companies which “engage customers, connecting with them in a 
personal, memorable way” (Pine and Gilmore, 1999, p.3). 
The consumer no longer buys a branded product only in order to consume the good, but also 
for an emotive experience connected with the symbolic realm embodied in the brand. This 
new perspective, which has been termed the ‘experience economy’ (Pine and Giilmore, 1999), 
can be referred back to the concept of ‘vicarious consumption’, initially described over a 
century ago by Veblen (1899) but never adequately investigated by the economic theory. 
According to this view and consistent with sociology findings (Baudrillard, 1968), a good is 
not consumed because of any tangible need associated with that good, but rather for the 
semantic content which it conveys. In the experience economy, the goods and services 
consumed do satisfy some physical need-- for example a T-shirt, dinner at a particular 
restaurant, or a good glass of Brunello wine--yet what is really being consumed is in many 
cases the experience itself, with the actual good or service serving merely as a vehicle for 
obtaining it. In other words, the consumer's willingness to pay, as observed by the previously 
cited marketing contributions, is a function of the experience associated with the good (Aaker, 
1996), and the experience becomes all the more compelling with increasing brand strength. 
Drinking a glass of Brunello is not the same thing as drinking some other less-known wine, 
even if it has similar or superior qualities. Because what is actually being consumed and paid 
for here is the signified, i.e. Brunello, and not the referent, i.e. fine wine. To put it another 
way, the signified also becomes the referent and the product.  
This process is what some observers have termed the ‘decline of the referents', and which in 
modern society extends well beyond the market (Beebe, 2004). In the new economy of signs, 
signifier and referent are fused to form a new entity, and the sign becomes an economic object 
in its own right. Branding is thus a means for producing these experiences/signifieds and 
selling them to the consumer embedded within goods and services. It should be noted, in this 
connection, that the trademark-become-brand is not pure information, i.e. obtainable through 
some straightforward procedure like looking up a telephone number. Rather, it is only 
decipherable within the context of a language, meaning a system of social belonging--it is a 
thread in the cultural tapestry. Each sign has a meaning that belongs to a system of meanings, 
and this implies the possibility of detecting and judging differences between brands, which is 
the source of the strength of brands (Baudrillard, 1968; Geertz, 1973). 
Economists in general, and in particular neoclassical economists, essentially lack the proper 
analytical tools for investigating these issues, which are deeply rooted in the heart of the post-
industrial economy. 
It follows that unlike marketing, economics is geared toward dealing with tangible goods and 
services as the objects of production and exchange. Classical consumption theory assumes 
that consumers are able to evaluate the quality of any good or service on the basis of their 
tastes and information, and so determine what choices will maximise their utility function. In 
other words the consumer is always in a position to evaluate  the qualities of goods and 
services. Moreover,  consumer choices are treated simply as the decisions of autonomous 
maximising agents, each acting in isolation from the rest of society.  Actually, consumer   14
choices are influenced by those made by others and, above all, by firms: through advertising, 
to which branding is strictly related
25. Economists use the term ‘influenced’ in two distinct 
ways: by informative advertising versus persuasive advertising. It is unclear if we have two 
types of advertising used for different products and whether they are used jointly or alone. 
This distinction has simply a theoretical value, and it is employed to signal that economists 
are only interested in advertising as an informative means. By contrast, persuasive advertising 
has been relegated to the realms of psychology and sociology, so that humans are once again 
reduced--for the convenience of economists--into 'talking animals' that individually maximise 
given preferences in markets, thereby reinstating the old familiar analytical categories 
(McCloskey and Klamer, 1995). Neglecting persuasion, of course, has serious consequences 
for the analysis: as scholars have observed, consumer persuasion and opinions have taken on a 
central, even pre-eminent role in economic activities and the determination of GDP 
(McCloskey and Klamer, 1995).  
Nonetheless, the economics of advertising has been largely dominated, under the leadership of 
the Chicago school, by the idea that the informational-signalling role of advertising is the 
prevailing one. And because the amount of expenditure in advertising says something about 
the quality level of the advertised good, advertising has an informational value even 
irrespective of its content (Nelson, 1974).  
Some orthodox contributions have sought to abandon the signalling theory outright. In an 
intriguing article, Becker and Murphy (1993) assert that “We do not believe that the intensive 
advertising for Mueller beer, Chevrolet cars, or Marlboro cigarettes, to take a few examples, is 
signalling exceptionally high product quality”. They then attempt a sort of mediation with the 
hypothesis of the persuasive function of advertising, by including advertising among those 
goods concerning which consumers express preferences. In this way, according to the authors, 
advertising becomes a part of the consumer's utility function and can be either 'good', in which 
case its marginal utility is positive, or 'bad', in which case its marginal utility is negative, but 
in no case does it have positive effects on the marginal utility of the good which it promotes, 
that is to say it does not alter tastes. However advertising is not free to consumers, and the 
amount of it on offer is not determined by producers-- as this would in fact contradict the 
hypothesis that advertising does not alter tastes. It thus becomes one of the goods purchased 
by consumers, who determine its quantity and pay a price for it.  
This approach moves from the more conventional hypothesis—that the quantity and price of 
advertising are determined on markets from which consumers are absent or only indirectly 
represented, and the demand originates from other buyers (e.g. magazines, television, etc.) --
to the hypothesis that quantity and price are determined on a market where consumers are 
directly present.  
Nonetheless, the above solution does not seem to provide the economic analysis with any 
improved grasp of the existing markets where consumers obviously do not buy any specific 
quantity or piece of advertising concerning a single good: in order to support the consumer 
theory, advertising becomes a set of information whose single items are demanded by 
informed consumers. The main merit of this model appears to be that it reduces to 
economically tractable terms concepts that economics would otherwise be unable to address
26. 
As previously noted, in the case of trademark-become-brand the problem is treated in a 
similar way: the trademark is simply information useful for recognizing the product. 
Therefore, once again we are presented with a distorted view of reality. So generally 
                                                 
25 A recent literature (Frank, 2005) maintains that the utility deriving from income or consumption depends 
critically on how the choices we make compare to those made by others.. 
26 In effect Becker and Stigler (1993, p.949) clearly assert that the representation adopted by advertising derives 
from the observation that “[…] the taste-shifting approach has no theory of consumer choice, […] and cannot 
explain how consumers choose among different ads that require time, money, or other scarce resources”.   15
speaking, the neoclassical assumptions allow us to reach conclusions consistent with welfare 
economics, although they are sterile as they concern a never existing world. 
Recently Johnson and Myatt (2006) portrayed a more elaborate representation of advertising 
that makes a clear-cut distinction between real information and hype advertising and gives the 
reader helpful insights in understanding the role of the trademark in demand economics. 
While the former is somewhat related to the Becker and Murphy model, thus affecting 
demand rotation and the horizontal position of the product, the latter, in the vein of branding, 
is devoted to shifting demand and increases the perceived vertical position of the product. 
This model refers to Lancaster’s (1971) seminal contribution proposing useful suggestions for 
trying to overcome the limits of the neoclassical approach.  
According to Lancaster, each good has a set of associated characteristics which determine its 
nature and objective and/or perceived quality. What the consumer selects and purchases are 
actually these characteristics, with the good serving only to contain them. Using this approach 
it is possible to better understand the concepts of vertical and horizontal differentiation and to 
interpret the distinction between informative and persuasive advertising, also in accordance 
with Johnson and Myatt’s analysis (2006). 
Advertising can play a double role. On the one hand, it can signal specific features of a 
product, and the consumer will then be able to distinguish among different products in terms 
of their objective, qualitative characteristics. This is the case for informative advertising, 
which mainly concerns products for which consumers want information on objective quality. 
On the other hand, it can be used to alter consumer perception, thus favouring specific 
characteristics or creating new characteristics linked to the semiotic and semantic dimension, 
which can ‘dominate’ the other qualitative characteristics. This is exactly the aim of branding. 
Ferrari’s brand strategy is just marginally directed at signalling the technical features of the 
car, and largely devoted to making this car a vector of a status, of an idiosyncratic and unique 
experience, thus transforming it into a symbol. At the end of the day, the semiotic value can 
dominate the objective value to the point that the former becomes more important for 
consumer choice, and this has serious implications in terms of welfare. 
For example in the presence of both objective differentiation between products and semiotic 
differentiation, the consumer may be led astray in his choices if he allows the semiotic 
component to prevail when the objective component would point to a different choice
27. This 
would have to be considered a negative eventuality from the standpoint of material needs, 
because it imposes investments in the semiotic component that do not change the objective 
nature of the good, but still use up resources that could otherwise be allocated elsewhere. But 
it would have to be positive if one takes the view that the semiotic component, no matter how 
ephemeral, somehow increases the utility to the consumer (Aaker, 1991 and 1996).  
The same line of reasoning can then also be used to justify counterfeiting, provided that it 
does not displace the production of originals or deceive the consumer. This is precisely the 
case of what is termed non-deceptive foreign counterfeiting, in which consumers are able to 
distinguish the fakes from the originals, as discussed by Grossman and Shapiro (1988). The 
proposed interpretation is intriguing and consistent with the semiotic perspective: given that 
the sign is to a certain extent separate from the good, the consumption of referents, even if 
counterfeited, can produce utility equal to that of the originals, provided it does not 
compromise the signified. Therefore if the net balance between this effect and the externalities 
imposed upon the trademark owner (Grossman and Shapiro, 1988) and the original signifier is 
positive, the counterfeiting will be welfare-enhancing. The consequence is that it should be 
tolerated, which in policy terms ought to result in a weakening, rather than a strengthening, of 
ownership over signs. 
                                                 
27 For example, given 2 differentiated goods A and B, it may be that in the absence of semiotic differentiation A 
is preferred to B, whereas with differentiation the roles are reversed and B becomes preferred over A.   16
This short list of ambiguities illustrates, on the one hand the need of more advanced models in 
the economics of demand, and on the other hand how the final welfare evaluation depends 
greatly on what theoretical approach adopted. In any case, relying on assumptions that are 
unsupported by fact, in order to continue using models developed for obsolete contexts of 
production and exchange, does not appear to be the most promising route. Rather, what is 
needed is an effort to understand what the buying and selling of signs truly implies, and the 




The above discussion raises further questions concerning the market structure, relating in 
particular to the mode of competition that characterises the economy of signs and experiences, 
and hence the role of trademark in that scenario.  
One interesting example of a market where the signified plays a central role is that of 
entertainment goods and sports events regulated by copyright or similar exclusive rights 
(Frank and Cook, 1995; Silva and Ramello, 2000; Nicita and Ramello, 2005). Consumer 
choices in this arena are very much dictated by impulses of an emotive nature, and factors 
such as a desire for belonging or identification.  
Markets such as these are governed by a "star system" in which the star is a great deal  more 
than just a signal of the product's quality: it is the actual product. So the previously described 
triangular relation between signifier (the star), signified (the semantic content associated with 
the star) and referent (the particular item, e.g. a CD, or a specific event) no longer applies. 
Here, the star is signifier, signified and referent all in one-- it is the content of the 
consumption. The consumers on their part act on impulse, subject only to the economic 
criterion of the balance constraints on that type of consumption; they do not choose between 
different stars by optimising on the basis of relative price
28. Because of the characteristics of 
the goods sold and the criteria for their selection, winner-take-all competition tends to prevail 
in these markets (Frank and Cook, 1995). Each product is associated with a star, and so a 
dimension of the market is dependent on the success of the star, and hence on the selection of 
stars on the market and the investments made by the 'firms' which utilise that resource. 
Revenues consequently increase in proportion to the appeal of the stars, who appropriate a 
share of these revenues as a function of their contractual power. Such an economy is 
dominated by non-price competition and very strong differentiation of goods.  
Although the wide variety of offerings is a welfare-enhancing factor for the consumer
29, it is 
also true that in these markets the rents are not contestable, at least not for a certain time 
period that varies from case to case, to the detriment of the consumer's welfare. Such a 
monopoly price discriminates against that portion of the market whose willingness to pay is 
lower, so it is not surprising that alternative 'competitive' offerings of an illegal nature often 
emerge, given that the market exists and is protected through the effect of copyright (Silva 
and Ramello, 2000).  
The above described market mechanism has been observed in many spheres, including those 
of trademark. Brand thus becomes an analogue of the star, in the sense that it is purchased for 
the signified, with which the consumer identifies to some extent (Schmitt and Simonson, 
                                                 
28 Experimental economics has peripherally observed that a consumer's willingness to pay for a CD is dependent 
on the title, and there is very low interchangeability between titles by different artists (Maffioletti and Ramello, 
2004).  
29 Variety is in any case a relative concept, indicating the manner in which different offerings are distributed 
around the fashion trend. It is plausible that fashion trends in these sectors are the result of investrademarkents 
made to create them, so that the various offerings share many common traits and tend to cluster around the 
fashion trend.   17
1997). Because the strength of a brand is determined by the quantity and quality of marketing 
and advertising investments, "arms-races" can result for enabling a particular brand to 
dominate its competitors. Here again a winner-take-all outcome is likely, only in this case the 
revenue positions are sustained not by expenditure on the market of stars, but rather through 
the promotion of winning stories representing the product.  The chances of a particular brand 
becoming dominant increase in proportion to its communicative power relative to other 
brands—i.e. its differential distinctiveness. And once a successful brand has been created, it 
can be leveraged to transfer the acquired market power elsewhere, thereby distorting 
competition. This transfer can take place between different markets through brand extension 
and stretching (Pepall and Richards, 2002), as well as to new economies in which local brands 
are very weak (Baroncelli et al., 2005). 
There is therefore a significant discrepancy, in the information theory of trademark, between 
the observed reality and its stylised mainstream representation. The perfect competition at all 
costs expounded in the elegant model of Landes and Posner (1987; 2003) is not actually 
observed in most real-world situations, and so has only the merit of intellectual appeal. Or in 
the words of Scherer (1977, pp. 998-999), whose observation has gone largely unheeded, 
“First, no amount of semantic waffling […] can paper over the fact that possession of a well-
received brand image is a form of monopoly power. […] Second, it seems to me that, at least 
in the consumer goods industries, image advantages confer a qualitatively important form of 
monopoly power – perhaps the most important […]”.A continual validation against the facts 
remains the only acceptable frame of reference.  
The model that appears to most successfully stylise this type of image-led market, in terms of 
the verisimilitude of its representation and predictions confirmed by empirical observations in 
numerous case studies (Sutton, 1991), is vertical differentiation through endogenous sunk 
costs consisting of marketing expenditure. The prediction is that “[…] the larger the size of 
the market […] the greater might be the sunk costs thereby incurred at equilibrium […and] 
[u]nder very general conditions a lower bound exists to the equilibrium level of concentration 
in the industry, no matter how large the market becomes […] increases in the market size 
cannot lead to a fragmented market structure as the size of the market increases” (Sutton, 
1991, p. 11). It is worth remembering that the cause of concentration is the ability of 
advertising to differentiate products. This leads jointly to both the huge advertising 
investments and a concentrated industrial structure.  
The resultant welfare balance is far from univocal. It cannot be robustly determined whether 
advertising investments are excessive, or whether the variety produced is optimal, although 
the tendency for certain brands to prevail seems to indicate a clustering of the variety about 
the fashion trends. Finally, with respect to price, a market characterised by vertical 
differentiation--achieved through heavy advertising investments aimed at creating brand value 
by leveraging willingness to pay—produces revenue positions clearly not favourable to the 
consumer
30. So generally speaking the market structure that emerges has little in common 
with the competition that produces welfare. 
Trademark thus plays a twofold role within the markets under discussion. In the first place, it 
produces the signifier required for the branding strategies. In the second place, by effect of its 
exclusive attribution to the owner--further extended through the recent anti-dilution clauses—
trademark protects the semantic capital of the brand, reinforcing its low interchangeability and 
market power.  
                                                 
30 There are many examples of such revenue positions. One of these is the case of water. In Italy, the quality of 
tap water is good, in fact often better than that of bottled mineral water. And yet the consumption of mineral 
water, whose price is enormously higher than that of tap water, prevails, with the market dominated by a few 
brands with a strong presence on the advertising markets (ref. Altroconsumo  press release 25-5-2006 at 
http://www.altroconsumo.it/map/show/12240/src/107612.htrademark)    18
Although it is true that the absence of trademark—or of its legal protection--would enable 
competitors to 'steal' benefits from those who invest in the quality and identification of a good 
(for which reason trademark law originated as a part of tort law), it is equally true that its 
conversion into brand allows a huge potential of persuasive power and the attendant market 
power to unfold. Some scholars have shown, for example, that the brand associated with a 
pharmaceutical product can be used to de facto extend the monopoly of an expired patent, 
even when there are generic drugs available that are perfect substitutes in terms of chemical 
composition. The owners of the strong trademark then accentuate this effect through the 
introduction of additional generic products, to create a sort of ‘background noise' that allows 
the branded drug to stand out better (Morton, 1999; Kong and Seldon, 2004).  
We must therefore be careful to consider both the positive and negative aspects of trademark, 
remembering that the latter are magnified by the extension of the right. In particular, when the 
trademark becomes the actual object of consumption, with low interchangeability due to the 
uniqueness of its semantic content, then the strengthening and extension of appropriability 
through the property right coincides with a strengthening of monopoly power
31. This 
necessarily produces inefficiency. 
In this light it can also be argued that the geographical expansion of trademark, as facilitated 
by the TRIPs agreements, will extend the revenue areas, with welfare-reducing consequences 
that may be further aggravated by negative effects on local or emerging industries, and on 
other producers with weaker signs.  
In the final analysis, given that the welfare effects are unclear and the overall balance is 
uncertain, it would be advisable to follow Arrow's (1962) recommendation of favouring 
policies that preserve the competitive nature of the market and adopt a critical--or even 
radical--stance toward those institutions whose ability to create welfare is in doubt.  
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
Trademark is a commercial device that has been used since antiquity, with its presence in 
markets long predating the establishment of intellectual property as a specific legal category. 
Its advent is connected with the problem of information asymmetries and the need to provide 
information for assisting exchanges, so as to avert the market failure brought about by adverse 
selection. In these terms trademark was therefore established as a tool for reinstating the 
competitive process and promoting efficiency.  
However this information-conveying function is also accompanied by a differentiation effect, 
arising from the power of persuasion that signs can exert on individuals. The pragmatic 
exploitation of differentiation has given rise to the practice of branding, which ties markets 
and consumption to the realms of meaning and experience. Branding is so all-pervasive in 
today's economy as to have somehow transfigured it, so that the role  of persuasion is now 
pre-eminent. 
The prevailing economic theory tends to resist acknowledging this change, which would to a 
large extent call into question well-established hypotheses and theoretical tools. The general 
response has therefore been to assume that the informational role of trademark predominates, 
and to use this hypothesis to construct models, welfare evaluations and policy prescriptions 
that bear little or no relation to the actual markets.  
The opposing approach is that of Nelson and Arrow, who instead recognise the idiosyncratic 
character of information and therefore recommend drawing conclusions and devising 
                                                 
31 In this light, the current legal trends for extending trademark protection through anti-dilution clauses appear 
particularly questionable.   19
solutions that, while still based upon the welfare criterion, also incorporate a wider awareness 
and a deeper representation of the scenario under study. The present work has attempted to 
move in this direction, showing how law, marketing and semiology can provide some key 
epistemological tools for enabling economists to effectively evaluate the welfare outcomes of 
the introduction and progressive alteration of a particular intellectual property right within the 
realm of signs and meanings.  
This approach also affords a critical perspective on some recent developments in the 
regulation and interpretation of trademark which have extended the legal protection, 
particularly that given to famous trademarks. A specific example are the anti-dilution clauses 
introduced into  many national regulations, which serve to strengthen the revenue positions 
acquired by famous trademarks and facilitate their territorial expansion. It is not easy to 
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